2nd of February 2025

Update on the 29th of January 2025 midair collision between an American Eagle CRJ-701ER, and a US Army Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, callsign PAT25.

NTSB news conference on 1st of February 2025 based on preliminary information downloaded from the CVR and FDR retrieved from the CRJ and ADSB data; the CVR/FDR from the helicopter had been recovered but downloading of that data was still pending at this time.

Prior to descent from a cruising altitude of 37 000 feet, the flight crew briefed the expected arrival procedure for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 01 at DCA.

Timeline

At 20:39:10 local time (01:39:10 UTC) the Potomac Approach controller cleared the flight for a Mount Vernon visual approach to runway 01.

At 20:43:06 the crew made initial contact with the DCA Tower. The controller asked if the crew could switch to runway 33. After a brief discussion between the crew they accepted runway 33.

At 08:46:01 the Tower controller called the Black Hawk helicopter, PAT25, advising them that a CRJ was at 1200 feet just south over Woodrow Wilson Bridge circling to runway 33.

At 20:46:29 the crew of the CRJ received a 1000 ft automated call out.

At 20:46:47 the tower cleared another jet to take-off from runway 01 with no delay.

At 20:47:29 the crew of the CRJ received a 500 ft automated call out.

At 20:47:39 DCA tower called PAT25 asking them if they had the CRJ in sight.

At 20:47:40 the crew of the CRJ received an automated Traffic Advisory call out ('Traffic, Traffic').

At 20:47:42 the tower directed PAT 25 to pass behind the CRJ.

At 20:47:58 the CRJ increased its pitch and a second later a collision occurred.

At the time of the collision the altitude of the CRJ was 325 ft (plus or minus 25 ft).

The NTSB explained that although the fixed-wing aircraft were on a VHF radio frequency while the helicopter was on UHF, the Tower controller was transmitting simultaneously on both frequencies; therefore, the instructions to PAT25 were recorded on the CRJ’s CVR but not the replies from the helicopter.  

The NTSB stated hat at the time of the accident, there were five controllers in the DCA tower cab: 1) A Ground Controller handling all aircraft and vehicles not on the runway; 2) A Local Controller handling helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft, arrivals and departures and the use of the runway; 3) A Local Assist Controller, responsible for assisting the Local Controller in multiple tasks; an Operations Supervisor with direct oversite over the tower; and an Operations Supervisor “in training”.

The NTSB also mentioned that on the day before the accident, another Priority Air Transport helicopter, PAT11, was in “close contact” with a Republic Air flight which discontinued its landing and made a go-around. According to the data currently available, in that incident there was over 1000 feet of separation between those two aircraft and the spokesman said that: “One thousand feet is a good safety value”.

Based on this preliminary but official information, the following can be concluded:

• The CRJ crew had prepared for an ILS approach to runway 01 but approach control gave them a visual approach instead.

•  When already lined-up on final approach to runway 01, the controller asked the crew if they would accept runway 33 instead. After a brief discussion (correct CRM), the crew accepted the change to runway 33, obviously wanting to cooperate with ATC. The crew could have rejected this request because they had not prepared for this approach, which according to experienced airline pilots, is “very demanding”, even in daytime.

• Contrary to the runway 01 approach which follows the Potomac River, the runway 33 visual approach requires flying at low level over the city until reaching a Visual Guidance Fix (VGF) at an elevation of 490 feet and then turning left to line-up with the runway. It also crosses over helicopter Route 4.

• The descent from the VGF to the threshold of runway 33 calls for an average slope of 3.23° and the approach plate warns that the VASI 3.00° and descent angles do not coincide. With the required rate-of-descent, the flightpath crosses helicopter Route 4 at an elevation of less than 240 feet. Clearly, landing on runway 33 should not be allowed if there is helicopter traffic along Route 4.

• Based on ADSB data published by Flightradar 24, the CRJ was on the correct flightpath and slightly above the required glidepath for runway 33.

• When it collided with the CRJ, the helicopter was near the middle of the river channel when it should have been hugging the East bank of the river and 100-150 feet above its maximum permitted altitude of 200 feet.

• The CRJ received a Traffic Advisory from its TCAS about 18 seconds before the collision.

• In the CDA tower cab there was a Local Controller and his assistant responsible for guiding aircraft landing and taking-off from CDA and also helicopter traffic along Route 4, plus a Supervisor and a supervisor-in-training. Therefore, there should have been four pairs of eyes and ears following this traffic, any of which should have realised that there was a potential conflict of separation between the CRJ and the helicopter flying south along Route 4 as soon as the Tower Controller requested and authorised the approach to runway 33; this was more than four minutes before the collision.

Unsafe ATC practices in the USA

Further thoughts on the Washington midair collision

Landing on runway 33 with helicopter traffic on route 4

Whatever the outcome of the investigation and the NTSB’s final report, which may take 1-2 years before it is published, it is evident that there was a potential conflict of separation between the airliner and the helicopter from the moment that ATC instructed the airliner to change from runway 01 to runway 33; this was recognised by the tower controller when he asked the helicopter if they had theairliner in sight. The obvious conclusion is that landing on runway 33 should be prohibited if there is helicopter traffic on Route 4, and vice versa. It has been reported that the FAA has now prohibited helicopter traffic on tis route.

Unsafe ATC practices in US airspace

More generally, I believe that this tragedy calls for a reappraisal of the following practices in the US air traffic control system:

1. The principle of “see and avoid” as applied to airline traffic. This principle has been unable to prevent midair collisions between slow-flying general aviation aircraft in an aerodrome pattern and has failed in many of the 54 midair collisions involving airliners with more than 3300 fatalities since 1954; 1 in 3 of these accidents and fatalities involved a military aircraft. In the case of this accident, when the controller allowed the helicopter to apply “visual separation” with the CRJ, it relieved the controller of the task of ensuring the required separation and instead relied entirely on the crew of the helicopter to apply this doubtful principle. My opinion is that “see and avoid” and “visual separation” should not be relied upon to maintain safe separation with and between airliners in controlled airspace.

2. The US practice of clearing multiple aircraft to land pending the runway to be clear of traffic. This is not allowed in the rest of the world, where a clearance to land is only issued once the runway is clear. This “US only” practice does not expedite traffic but allows the controller to “take his eyes off the ball” at a critical moment and has led to several serious incidents at US airports. In the case of this accident, the controller cleared two more aircraft to land on runway 01 (which crosses runway 33) after he had cleared Bluestreak 5342 to land on runway 33. My opinion is that this is an unsafe practice and should be discontinued.

3. Nighttime visual approaches. These entail greater risks than daytime visual approaches and for this reason are prohibited by several international airlines. This practice has caused friction between pilots and controllers and some serious incidents at US airports. In my opinion, this is an unsafe practice for airliners and should be restricted to general aviation or when the runway in use does not have an instrument landing system. Naturally, this prohibition will reduce capacity at some major airports, especially in the northern winter months, but this is a necessary sacrifice in favour of safety.

Washington DC midair collision

Wreckage of the CRJ in the Potomac River with Reagan National Airport in the background

31st of January 2025

At 8:48 pm on the evening of 29th January 2025, a midair collision occurred between a Bombardier CRJ-701ER registration N709PS, and a US Army Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, callsign PAT25. Both aircraft crashed into the Potomac River near Ronald Reagan National Airport (KDCA). All 60 passengers and four crewmembers of the CRJ-701 and the three crewmembers in the Army helicopter, were fatally injured.

PSA Airlines Flight JIA5342 was operating on behalf of American Eagle Flight 5342, a regular scheduled passenger flight from Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (KICT) in Wichita, Kansas, to Ronald Reagan National Airport, DC (DCA) in Washington, DC.

¿What happened?

According to news and social media, the regional airliner with callsign Bluestreak 5342 was flying due north on a visual approach to DCA runway 01 when air traffic control (ATC) asked the crew if they could land instead on runway 33, which the crew accepted; ATC then cleared another CRJ callsign Jazz 789 to take-off with no delay from runway 01.  Bluestreak 5342 was instructed to change to runway 33 as it crossed over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge and was cleared to land on runway 33. Once over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, Bluestreak 5342 turned to the East and initiated the required circling approach procedure over the East bank of the Potomac River, descending in a left turn to line-up for runway 33.

The Army helicopter callsign PAT25 was on a routine training flight, flying south on helicopter Routes 1 and 4 over the eastern shore of the Potomac River; these helicopter routes have a stipulated maximum allowed altitude of 200 feet between the Lincoln Memorial Bridge and the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. ATC informed the crew of the helicopter that there was traffic just south of the Woodrow Bridge, a CRJ at 1200 feet, setting-up for runway 33 and asked if it had the CRJ in sight. The crew of the helicopter confirmed that it had the traffic in sight and requested visual separation, which ATC approved. Later, when the CRJ was turning to final for runway 33 at around 400 feet, ATC again asked the helicopter if they had the CRJ in sight and to pass behind the CRJ, to which the crew replied that they had the aircraft in sight and again requested visual separation. Very shortly after this exchange, the collision occurred at an altitude of approximately 400 feet.

Other possible contributing causes

• That a single tower controller was controlling aircraft landing and taking-off from KDCA and also helicopter traffic along Route 1.

• That the fixed-wing aircraft and the helicopter were on different radio frequencies: the controller could communicate with both aircraft but the CRJ could not hear the communications with the helicopter and was not informed of the helicopter traffic.

• That the helicopter pilots were using night vision goggles, which enhance night vision but limit the field of vision.

• That when the two aircraft were in a position to “see and avoid” each other they were travelling head-on with little apparent lateral motion, making it difficult to distinguish their lights from all the other lights in this area.

• That the helicopter crew may not have understood that the CRJ was circling over their route to line-up with runway 33 and were instead focussed on another aircraft on approach to runway 01 behind Bluestreak 5342.

• That the Terrain and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) on the CRJ would have shown the position of the helicopter on its screen and should have issued a traffic advisory (TA) of a potential conflict to the crew. If the helicopter also had TCAS, this would also apply to the helicopter crew, but resolution advisories (RA) which instruct the aircraft to either climb or descend are inhibited below 1000 feet.