Unsafe ATC practices in the USA

Further thoughts on the Washington midair collision

Landing on runway 33 with helicopter traffic on route 4

Whatever the outcome of the investigation and the NTSB’s final report, which may take 1-2 years before it is published, it is evident that there was a potential conflict of separation between the airliner and the helicopter from the moment that ATC instructed the airliner to change from runway 01 to runway 33; this was recognised by the tower controller when he asked the helicopter if they had theairliner in sight. The obvious conclusion is that landing on runway 33 should be prohibited if there is helicopter traffic on Route 4, and vice versa. It has been reported that the FAA has now prohibited helicopter traffic on tis route.

Unsafe ATC practices in US airspace

More generally, I believe that this tragedy calls for a reappraisal of the following practices in the US air traffic control system:

1. The principle of “see and avoid” as applied to airline traffic. This principle has been unable to prevent midair collisions between slow-flying general aviation aircraft in an aerodrome pattern and has failed in many of the 54 midair collisions involving airliners with more than 3300 fatalities since 1954; 1 in 3 of these accidents and fatalities involved a military aircraft. In the case of this accident, when the controller allowed the helicopter to apply “visual separation” with the CRJ, it relieved the controller of the task of ensuring the required separation and instead relied entirely on the crew of the helicopter to apply this doubtful principle. My opinion is that “see and avoid” and “visual separation” should not be relied upon to maintain safe separation with and between airliners in controlled airspace.

2. The US practice of clearing multiple aircraft to land pending the runway to be clear of traffic. This is not allowed in the rest of the world, where a clearance to land is only issued once the runway is clear. This “US only” practice does not expedite traffic but allows the controller to “take his eyes off the ball” at a critical moment and has led to several serious incidents at US airports. In the case of this accident, the controller cleared two more aircraft to land on runway 01 (which crosses runway 33) after he had cleared Bluestreak 5342 to land on runway 33. My opinion is that this is an unsafe practice and should be discontinued.

3. Nighttime visual approaches. These entail greater risks than daytime visual approaches and for this reason are prohibited by several international airlines. This practice has caused friction between pilots and controllers and some serious incidents at US airports. In my opinion, this is an unsafe practice for airliners and should be restricted to general aviation or when the runway in use does not have an instrument landing system. Naturally, this prohibition will reduce capacity at some major airports, especially in the northern winter months, but this is a necessary sacrifice in favour of safety.